TYING STAFF PRIVILEGES TO PHYSICIAN
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: AN EROSION
OF DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OR A
NECESSARY EVIL?*
H. Ward Classen**
Recently, many hospitals have entered into exclusive employment contracts with independent physician groups to provide health care services in an effort to reduce their costs.' At the
same time, a growing number of hospitals have included clauses
in their employment agreements with these physician groups
which provide that upon the termination of the contract, the contracting physicians will lose their staff privileges. Physicians have
agreed to the inclusion of such clauses because of their desire to
enter into these potentially lucrative contracts. 2 While these contractual relationships allow hospitals to provide more cost-efficient services, thereby lowering the overall expense of health
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I These contractual arrangements allow a hospital to reduce its malpractice liability by designating the contracting physicians as independent contractors. When
sued, the contract will be used as evidence showing that the hospital did not exercise control over the physician, and that the physician was an independent contractor, thereby exculpating the hospital from liability. For an in-depth discussion of
the use of the independent contractor exception in the health care context, see generally Classen, Hospital Liability for Independent Contractors: Where Do We Go From Here?,
40 ARK. L. REV. 469 (1987); Lisko, Hospital Liability Under Theories of Respondeat Superior and Corporate Negligence, 47 UMKC L. REV. 171 (1978); Southwick, The Hospital's
New Responsibility, 17 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 146 (1968).
In the 1960's, hospitals began to realize that they could provide better service
to patients and attending physicians by having a permanent group of in-house physicians provide ancillary services. These hospitals were primarily concerned with
continuity, organization and expanded service. In return for limiting the scope of
their practice, the physicians providing these ancillary services sought employment
contracts and the ability to bill patients separately from the hospital. Later, some
hospitals became worried that these physician groups might become difficult to dislodge if disagreements arose and sought to limit physician staff privileges. In the
ensuing negotiations, many physician groups agreed to limit their rights in exchange for exclusivity. Letter from Joseph R. Matire, M.D. to H. Ward Classen
(Dec. 4, 1987).
2 See infra text accompanying notes 126-27.
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care, 3 the inclusion of such clauses has been criticized by some
physician groups. 4
Physicians, threatened with the loss of their staff privileges,
have traditionally been accorded the right to due process of law.5
Furthermore, a hospital's bylaws usually proscribe additional
procedures for reviewing the revocation of staff privileges. Such
procedural safeguards are not extended to exclusive employment
contracts. The physician's staff privileges are simultaneously and
automatically terminated with his contract.6 Because his staff
privileges are contractual, the physician is prevented from exercising his due process rights. 7 Physicians have attacked this lack
3 Health care costs of the hospital or health care provider are reduced in several ways. First, administrative costs may be significantly reduced by having the
physician group responsible for billing the patients, hiring its own staff, maintaining any necessary equipment and managing all other aspects of providing services.
Additionally, physicians will provide their own malpractice insurance.
Second, under many agreements the physician group assumes the risk that a
particular service will be under-utilized. The physician group will benefit, however,
if a particular facility is over-utilized. For example, if few patients use the hospital's
emergency room, the physician group will lose money if the emergency room is
overstaffed. If the emergency room is extremely busy, however, the emergency
room will show a profit thereby benefiting the physician group.
4 The American College of Radiology (ACR) was one such group. See generally
ACR Bulletin, Dec. 1986.
5 See generally infra note 22 and accompanying text. Staff privileges allow physicians to admit their personal patients to a hospital and perform procedures for
which the physicians are qualified. The denial of staff privileges has been heavily
litigated. As to public hospitals, see Sosa v. Bd. of Managers of Val Verde Memorial Hosp., 437 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1971); Rosner v. Eden Township Hosp. Dist., 58
Cal.2d 592, 25 Cal. Rptr. 551, 375 P.2d 431 (1962); Martino v. Concord Community Hosp. Dist., 233 Cal. App. 2d 51, 43 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1965); Group Health
Coop. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951). As to
private hospitals, see Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964); Mulvihill v. Julia Butterfield Memorial
Hosp., 329 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J.
389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963); Woodard v. Porter Hosp., Inc., 125 Vt. 419, 217 A.2d 37
(1966). See also Hein, Hospital Staff Privileges and the Courts: Practice and Prognosis, 34
FED'N INS. COUNS. Q 157 (1984); McCall, A Hospital'sLiabilityfor Denying, Suspending
and Granting Staff Privileges, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 175 (1980).
6 See infra note 103 for an example of such contractual provisions.
7 See, e.g., Alonso v. Hosp. Auth. of Henry County, 175 Ga. App. 198, 332
S.E.2d 884 (1985).
Courts have recognized that a hospital's bylaws constitute a contract between
the hospital and a physician. SeeJoseph v. Passaic Hosp. Ass'n, 26 N.J. 557, 141
A.2d 18 (1958); Berberian v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 395 Pa. 257,
149 A.2d 456 (1959); St. John's Hosp. Medical Staff v. St. John Regional Medical
Center, Inc., 90 S.D. 674, 245 N.W. 2d 472 (1976). In Berberian the court stated
that "[t]he relationship between a hospital association and a member of the hospital's staff is based on contract .... " Berberian, 395 Pa. at 262, 149 A.2d at 458. The
court further observed that:
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of due process as unconstitutional, alleging that hospitals possess
superior bargaining power when entering into such contracts.
Hospitals, however, maintain that they are exercising a legitimate
contractual right which is necessary to insure the continued delivery of high-quality, cost-efficient health care.
This article examines the traditional physician-hospital relationship and the due process rights afforded to physicians in the
revocation of their staff privileges. Additionally, relevant case
law will highlight the relationship of staff privileges to employment agreements in hospital-physician contracts. Finally, this article will attempt to resolve the physician's need for due process
rights and the hospital's attempt to maintain cost-efficiency.
I.

THE PHYSICIAN-HOSPITAL RELATIONSHIP

The relationship between the physician and the health care
provider is often confusing to the lay person. Most hospitals
classify physicians according to a definitional nature of their pracWhile [the doctor's] relationship to the hospital was not that of
membership in a voluntary organization, nevertheless he and the hospital had, in legal contemplation, entered into a contract whereof the provisions of the staff by-laws, as approved by the hospital's board of
directors, constitute the legally binding terms. In the circumstances
In
present, the defendant corporation is bound by the staff by-laws ....
both instances, the respective organizations have enacted and approved
the by-laws which are an integral part of the contractual relationship
between such organizations and their members or ones holding under
them.
Id. at 265, 149 A.2d at 459.
Under contract law, an individual may waive any provision inserted in a contract for his own benefit. See Koedding v. Slaughter, 634 F.2d 1095, 1097 (8th Cir.
1980) (a party may waive favorable contract terms); National Util. Serv. Inc. v.
Whirlpool Corp., 325 F.2d 779, 781 (2d Cir. 1963) (party may waive conditional
performance inserted for his benefit in contract); Berks Title Ins. Co. v. Haendiges,
591 F. Supp. 879, 886 (N.D. Ohio 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 772 F.2d 278 (6th
Cir. 1985) (contract term may be waived by conduct of parties and subsequent
acts); Terry v. Int'l Dairy Queen, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 1088, 1095 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (a
party may impliedly waive contractual provision inserted for party's benefit by
knowing and willing acquiescence); TVA v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 429 F. Supp.
940, 943 (E.D. Va. 1977) (parties may waive rights secured under contract); Chung
v. Park, 377 F. Supp. 524, 529 (M.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 514 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1975)
(contractual provisions can be expressly or impliedly waived); Oleg Cassini, Inc. v.
Couture Coordinates, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 821, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (party may eliminate a condition or waive a provision inserted in a contract for his benefit without
consideration); In re Gordon Car and Truck Rental, Inc., 59 Bankr. 956, 962
(N.D.N.Y. 1985) (party's implied or express intention may waive contract terms included for his benefit). Thus, a physician may waive the due process rights contained within the hospital's bylaws which serve as his contract.
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tice.' The most common form of practice is through "staff privileges," usually granted to private physicians. 9 Staff privileges
allow physicians the right to admit and discharge their private
patients to and from the hospital as well as the right to use the
hospital's facilities.' 0 Another group includes those physicians
who are still in training. This includes externs, who are third and
fourth year medical students; interns, who are typically one year
out of medical school; and residents, who have completed their
internship. All of these individuals practice under the supervision of an experienced physician.
Hospitals also employ full-time salaried physicians often referred to as "hospital based" physicians.'
Included in this category are the faculties of the teaching hospitals that educate
externs, interns and residents; and those physicians who have
contracted with the hospital, for a set salary to provide medical
services on behalf of the hospital. These individuals usually do
not admit patients to a hospital, but they are responsible for
treating patients who have already been admitted by other physicians. 12 Hospital-based physicians include radiologists, anesthesiologists and pathologists.
Staff privileges are extremely important to the practicing
physician. The high cost of modern technology and the high degree of technological sufficiency necessary to support many medical procedures require that a physician have access to a full
service hospital. 13 Access to a hospital through staff privileges
8 See infra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
9 Once a physician has been granted "staff privileges" he will be accorded
"clinical privileges" which allow him to perform certain procedures. "Clinical privileges" have been defined as "permission to provide medical or other patient care
services in the granting institution, within well-defined limits, based on the individ-

ual's professional license and his experience, competence, ability, and judgment."
JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, Accreditation Manualfor Hospi-

tals 109 (1987) [hereinafter JCAH].
Io See id.

I I The term "hospital based physician" refers to the fact that traditionally their
practice was based at the hospital. Today, however, many hospital based physicians
such as radiologists have offices outside the hospital. See Anne Arundel Gen.
Hosp., Inc. v. O'Brien, 49 Md. App. 362, 365, 432 A.2d 483, 485 (1981).

12 Id. Hospital based physicians also perform diagnostic tests and procedures as
directed by admitting physicians. Id.
13 Many specialists such as radiologists require expensive equipment such as

Cerebral Axial Tomographers (CAT Scans) or Nuclear Magnetic Resonance machines (NMR's) which may cost over one million dollars each. Economies of scale
permit hospitals and other large organizations to own and operate this equipment
because the costs involved can be divided among a large patient population. The
high cost involved was the primary reason that the National Health Planning and
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often determines the extent of a physician's practice.I4 Without
the benefit of a full service hospital and its support services,
many physicians would be precluded from freely practicing their
medical specialty. Staff privileges also reflect peer approval and a
physician's status in the medical community. 1 5 Consequently, a
physician who is unable to obtain staff privileges may be severely
stigmatized.
Hospitals and other health care providers are becoming
more selective as to whom they will grant staff privileges. The
reason for such increased scrutiny is two-fold. First, while the
number of physicians in the general population continues to
grow, 6 the number of available hospital beds has declined. Second, many plaintiffs are attempting to hold hospitals liable for
the negligent actions of the physicians who practice at the hospital. 17 Consequently, as a means of reducing their potential liability, hospitals are employing a discerning approach to awarding
staff privileges.
When a physician applies for staff privileges he undertakes a
long and arduous process. Initially, a credentials committee will
review the physician's application to determine if he is professionally qualified to practice medicine.'" Following an interview
Development Resources Act of 1974 was enacted. See 42 U.S.C. § 300(k) (1976),
repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-660 § 701(a), 100 Stat. 3799 (1986). Because state regulation of the health care industry has increased, this act was repealed. See id.
14 See, e.g., Engelstad v. Virginia Mun. Hosp., 718 F.2d 262, 267 (8th Cir. 1983)
(physician's reputation is often measured by whether or not he possesses hospital
staff privileges); Burkette v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 595 F.2d 255, 256 (5th Cir.
1979) (physician's private practice may be seriously hampered by denial of staff
privileges); Foster v. Mobile County Hosp. Bd., 398 F.2d 227, 229 (5th Cir. 1968)
(denial of privileges would restrict access to advanced medical equipment, curtail
economic remuneration for treatment of patients in the hospital and damage overall physician-patient relationships); Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hosp. Dist., 174 Cal.
App. 2d 709, 715, 345 P.2d 93, 97 (1959) ("much of what a physician or surgeon
must do can only be performed in a hospital").
15 See Engelstad, 718 F.2d at 267 ("Staff privileges are basically viewed as a reflection of the measure of proficiency a doctor attains in his medical specialty.").
16 The number of medical degrees that have been granted continues to increase.
In 1960, 7,032 medical degrees were conferred; 8,314 in 1970; 12,447 in 1975;
14,902 in 1980; and 15,813 in 1984. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 148 (107th ed. 1987). In certain geographical areas of the United States there is already an over-abundance of
physicians.
17 See generally Classen, supra note 1.
'8 See Holbrook & Dunn, Medical Malpractice Litigation: The Discoverability and Use
of Hospitals' Quality Assurance Committee Records, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 54, 59-60 (1976);
Note, Medical Staff Membership Decisions: JudicialIntervention, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 473,
477.
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and a thorough check of the physician's educational background
and professional references, the committee will make a recommendation as to his suitability for practicing medicine at the hospital." The medical staff executive committee will also review
the physician's qualifications. Finally, a recommendation is made
to the hospital's governing board which will render a final
decision. (
Upon joining a medical staff, a contract is created between
the facility and the physician who agrees to abide by the bylaws,
rules, regulations and policies of the hospital as well as of the
medical staff.2 ' The contract generally incorporates procedural
safeguards which are triggered upon the termination of the physician's practice privileges at the hospital. 2 2 Furthermore, it has
been recognized that a physician has a property interest in his
staff privileges and is thus entitled to due process of law. 23
Staff privileges are customarily granted for a limited time period, such as two years. When this period expires, the physician
seeking reappointment is usually entitled to some measure of
due process.- If, however, a hospital rejects a physician's initial
application for staff privileges with a stated meritorious reason,
the physician cannot avail himself of the protections of the hospital's bylaws and governing provisions.2 5
19 See Holbrook & Dunn, supra note 18, at 59-60; Note, supra note 18, at 477.
See Note, supra note 18, at 477.
See Joseph v. Passaic Hosp. Ass'n, 26 N.J. 557, 569, 141 A.2d 18, 24-25
(1958); Berberian v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 395 Pa. 257, 262, 149
A.2d 456, 458 (1959); Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 277 Pa. Super. 370, 374, 419 A.2d
1191, 1193 (1980); St. John's Hosp. Medical Staff v. St. John Regional Medical
Center, Inc., 90 S.D. 674, 245 N.W.2d 472 (1976); O'Leary v. Bd. of Directors, 89
Wis.2d 156, 278 N.W.2d 217 (Ct. App. 1979).
22 See Northeast Georgia Radiological Ass'n v. Tidwell, 670 F.2d 507, 511 (5th
Cir. 1982); Shaw v. Hospital Auth. of Cobb County, 507 F.2d 625, 629 (5th Cir.
1975); Woodbury v. McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839, 842 (5th Cir. 1971) (all recognizing
physician's right to reappointment until hearing is held in which hospital authorities evaluate whether the physician has met reasonable professional standards).
23 See Poe v. Charlotte Memorial Hosp., Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1302, 1312
(W.D.N.C. 1974).
24 117oodbury, 447 F.2d at 842. "Once having become a member of the hospital
surgical staff Dr. Woodbury had a right to reappointment until the governing authorities determined after a hearing conforming to the minimum requirements of
procedural due process that he did not meet the reasonable standards of the hospital." Id. The fact that the case was decided before Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972), may leave doubt as to whether it would be decided the same way
today. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (discussing Roth).
25 See Hayman v. City of Galveston, 273 U.S. 414, 416-17 (1927); Woodbury v.
McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839, 842-43 (5th Cir. 1971); Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val
Verde Memorial Hosp., 437 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 1971).
20
21

SE TON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 18:4

Physicians traditionally have had their staff privileges terminated only for endangering patients' lives, failure to follow staff
policies, or for rendering poor quality health care. Economic
pressures, however, recently have encouraged health care providers to terminate staff privileges for economic reasons. Consequently, many hospitals have attempted to rewrite their bylaws to
deny physicians any of their due process rights.2 6 At the same
time, many hospitals have attempted to induce physicians to
waive their due process rights when entering into employment
agreements with the hospital.2 7 Although such action has been
encouraged by members of the legal profession,28 the legitimacy
of waiving one's right to due process and the underlying constitutional concerns remains unresolved.
II.

TRADITIONAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS

The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution recognize an individual's right to due process of
law. 29 The concept of procedural due process encompasses both
an individual's liberty and property interests.3 0 Specifically, the
United States Supreme Court has required that defendants be
notified of any legal action brought against them and that they be
given an opportunity to set forth a defense to these charges. 3
A typical provision which may be inserted in the bylaws is as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of these bylaws, or of the
rules and regulations, the Hospital may provide by Agreement that a
physician's membership on the medical staff and clinical privileges are
contingent on and shall expire simultaneously with such Agreement or
understanding. In the event that an Agreement has such a provision or
there is such an understanding, the provisions of these bylaws, rules and
regulations, and policies of the medical staff and of the Hospital with
respect to hearings, appellate review, etc., shall not apply.
27 A typical clause included in a physician-provider contract is as follows:
Notwithstanding any provisions of the bylaws, rules and regulations, and policies of the Hospital and of the medical staff, the medical
staff membership and clinical privileges of the physician shall terminate
simultaneously with the termination of this Agreement. Provisions of
said bylaws, rules and regulations, and policies of the Hospital and of
the medical staff with respect to hearings, appellate review, etc., shall
not apply.
28 See BAKER & HOSTETLER, HOSPITAL CONTRACTS MANUAL § 2:15 (1987).
29 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law ....
); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law .....
30 Id.
3' See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-11 (1976); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,
539 (1971); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971); Milliken v.
26
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These rights include the right to counsel for the indigent, the
right to confrontation, and the right to a transcript of any judicial
proceedings. Further, these enumerated rights are specifically
mandated by the sixth amendment and are applicable to state action through the fourteenth amendment.2
In its broadest definition, substantive due process guarantees that no individual shall be arbitrarily deprived of life, liberty
or property. 3 Embodied in this concept is a requirement that
before an individual is deprived of life, liberty, property or any
statutory right granted to him, he is entitled to a trial conducted
by established rules governing the judicial hearing. 34 Furthermore, due process requires that a law not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious and that the law have a reasonable and
substantial relationship to its objective.3 5 In essence, substantive
due process ensures a "fundamental fairness." 3 6
A.

State Action

To invoke the fourteenth amendment right of due process,
the claimant must demonstrate the existence of state action and a
property or liberty interest. The fourteenth amendment provides that a "state [shall not] deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law." ' 37 The fourteenth
amendment guarantees the right of due process against state action but not against private action . 3 8 State action has been
broadly defined and has been applied to those actions which on
their face appear to be private in nature. 9
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 393 (1914); Roller v.
Holley, 176 U.S. 398, 409 (1900). See also Van Alstyne, Cracks in "the New Propertly"
Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445 (1977).
32 See Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel for indigents);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confrontation); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to transcript on appeal as of right).
33 See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
515-18 (1961) (DouglasJ., dissenting).
'34 Pettit v. Penn, 180 So.2d 66, 69 (La. Ct. App. 1965), cert. denied, 248 La. 696,
181 So.2d 397 (1966).
35 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
36 See Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 649 (1948) (quoting Heubert v. Louisiana,
272 U.S. 312, 316 (1976)). See also Nowak, Forward-Due Process Wethodolog' in the
PostincorporationWf'orld, 70J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGy, 397, 402-03 (1979) (comparing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) and Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584
(1979), with the balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
"37 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3'8 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S.

629, 638 (1882); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1875).
39 See infra notes 40-71 and accompanying text.
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To invoke the protections of the fourteenth amendment, one
must provide evidence of state action or show that a private action is so closely intertwined with state action that they cannot be
separated. Private action which has been found to constitute
state action is illustrated by reference to Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.4 ° In Burton, a state parking authority, which owned
and operated a parking garage, leased space to a restaurant on
the ground floor. A black customer brought suit when the restaurant refused to serve him, alleging a violation of the equal
4
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. '
The United States Supreme Court concluded that state action existed because the state leased the restaurant to its owners.
The Court commented that "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing
circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in
private conduct be attributed its true significance." '42 The Burton
Court justified its decision by citing the state's public ownership
of the land and the building, the use of public funds for the construction of the building, and the mutual benefits derived by the
state and the restaurant in operating the parking garage.4"
The Burton Court's reasoning was more recently applied in
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis4 4 and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co. 45 In Moose Lodge, a civic fraternity which owned a Pennsylvania liquor license refused to serve a black guest. The guest
brought suit claiming state involvement in the club's activities.
The plaintiff argued that the lodge's discriminatory practices
were forbidden by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.4 6 In contrast to Burton, the Supreme Court found
that no relationship existed between the state and the club sufficient to constitute state involvement.4 7 The Court concluded
that state action does not exist merely because a private entity
was subject to any degree of state regulation or because it re4
ceived any type of benefit or service from the state. 8
In Jackson, the Supreme Court held that a customer whose
electrical service had been terminated without due process or an
40 365 U.S. 715 (1961).

Id. at 716.
Id. at 722.
43 Id. at 723-24.
44 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
45 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
46 Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 165.
47 Id. at 175.
48 Id. at 173.
41

42
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amount she owed was not entitled to
opportunity to find out 4the
due process protection. 9 The Court ruled that state action exists where "there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State
and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself."5
The Jackson Court determined that the actions of the privately
owned and operated utility did not constitute state action solely
because the utility was extensively regulated by the state. 5 ' It
emphasized that Metropolitan Edison's status as a regulated industry that operated for the public interest did not justify extending fourteenth amendment due process protection to its
customers. 552
In applying this reasoning to health care providers, the judiciary has placed great emphasis on whether a hospital enjoys
53
public or private status. In Shulman v. Washington Hospital Center,
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia distinguished a public hospital from a private hospital. The court
stated that a public hospital is "[o]ne owned, maintained and operated by a governmental unit . . .supported by governmental
funds .... ",54 The court defined a private hospital as "one that is
owned, maintained and operated by a corporation or an individual without any participation on the part of any governmental
55
agency in its control."
In Briscoe v. Bock, 56 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit adopted the Jackson court's requirement of a
"sufficiently close nexus" for state action to exist. 57 In Briscoe,
the record indicated that the hospital received federal and other
public funds, enjoyed tax exempt status and was subject to state
regulation.5 " The court concluded, however, that no state action
was present.5' Rather, it stated that "there was no such nexus
between the state's relationship to the [h]ospital's operation and
4

9jackson, 419 U.S. at 358-59.

50 Id. at 351 (citing MVoose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 176).

Id. at 350.
Id. at 353-54.
5"3222 F. Supp. 59 (D.D.C. 1963), afd, 348 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
54 Id. at 61.
55 Id. The Shiulmon court found no state action with respect to revocation of staff
privileges when the hospital in question received government funds bt was privately owned and managed. Id. at 62.
56 540 F.2d 392 (8th Cir. 1976).
5"7 See id. at 395-96.
58 Id. at 394.
51

52

59 Id. at 396.
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the dismissal of the plaintiff as to justify attribution of the challenged action of the [h]ospital to the state."60 In Schlein v. Milford
Hospital,6 ' however, the District of Connecticut rejected the reasoning expressed in Jackson and adopted the Burton rationale.
The Schlein court determined that state action was present where
the hospital had been granted a license by the state which empowered it to determine the scope of the license required by a
physician .62

Other courts have concluded that neither the receipt of state
funding through the Medicare and Medicaid programs nor the
existence of state regulation when taken alone constitute state action." One court, however, has found that because a hospital
performs a public function, its actions are attributable to the
state, especially where the hospital is the only one in a particular
geographic area.6 4 This holding conflicts with the general rule
60

Id.

423 F. Supp. 541 (D. Conn. 1976).
Id. at 543.
See, e.g., Ward v. St. Anthony Hosp., 476 F.2d 671, 675-76 (10th Cir. 1973);
Doyle v. Unicare Health Serv., Inc., Aurora Center, 399 F. Supp. 69, 74 (N.D. Ill.
1975); Slavcoff v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hosp., 375 F. Supp. 999, 1003 (M.D. Pa.
1974); Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59, 61 (D.D.C. 1963).
In addition to government funding through Medicare and Medicaid, many
health care providers receive direct government assistance through the Hill-Burton
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 to 291o-I (1982). The Hill-Burton Act provides public funds
for the construction of hospitals and nursing homes in rural areas by not-for-profit
and government sponsored organizations. Additionally the act requires that in return for government funding, the health care providers are required to provide free
or reduced cost health care for 20 years after completion of construction. Furthermore, the act forbids a facility from denying access to the indigent or discriminating
on the basis of race, creed, color or sex, etc. To be eligible, the institution must
participate in Medicare or Medicaid. See id.
The courts are divided as to whether the receipt of Hill-Burton funding causes
a hospital to become "public" in nature. A number of courts have found a hospital
to be "private" despite the receipt of Hill-Burton construction funds. See, e.g., Barrio v. McDonough Dist. Hosp., 377 F. Supp. 317 (S.D. Ill. 1974); Mulvihill ,. Julia
L. Butterfield Mem. Hosp., 329 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Mauer v. Highland
Park Hosp. Found., 90 Ill. App.2d 409, 232 N.E.2d 776 (1967); Halberstadt v. Kissane, 31 A.D.2d 568, 294 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1968); Khoury v. Community Memorial
Hosp., Inc., 203 Va. 236, 123 S.E.2d 533 (1962); Woodard v. Porter Hosp., Inc.,
125 Vt. 419, 217 A.2d 37 (1966); State ex rel. Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n,
149 W.Va. 229, 140 S.E.2d 457 (1965).
Other courts, however, have held that the receipt of Hill-Burton funding characterizes a health care facility as "public" in nature. See Christhilf v. Annapolis
Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 496 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 552 F.2d 1070 (4th Cir. 1977); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp.,
323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
64 Meredith v. Allen County War Memorial Hosp. Comm'n, 397 F.2d 33, 35 (6th
Cir. 1968).
61

62
63
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that performing a public function in and of itself does not constitute state action. 65 Furthermore, institutions have been held to
be private even though operating for the public welfare,6 6 and
characterized as a public charity, 6 7 tax exempt, 6 s a non-profit in70
stitution, 69 and subject to the doctrine of charitable immunity.
Additionally, facilities built by the government or with government funds though operating as private hospitals still have been
deemed private. 7 '
B.

The Existence of a Liberty or Property Interest

Invoking the fourteenth amendment's due process protec72
tion also requires the existence of a liberty or property interest.
Prominent among these liberty and property interests are the
rights to obtain and to maintain employment without unreasonable government interference.73
1.

Liberty Interest

The requirement that a liberty interest exist in an employment relationship was first expressed in Board of Regents v. Roth."4
In Roth, the employment contract of a professor at a state univer65 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text; see also supra note 63.
66 See, e.g., Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59 (D.D.C.
1963), rev'd on other grounds, 348 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Moore v. Andalusia
Hosp., Inc., 284 Ala. 259, 224 So.2d 617 (1969); Natale v. Sisters of Mercy, 243
Iowa 582, 52 N.W.2d 701 (1952); Hughes v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 289 Ky. 123,
158 S.W.2d 159 (1942); Van Campen v. Olean Gen. Hosp., 210 A.D. 204, 205
N.Y.S. 554 (1924), aff'd, 239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E. 219 (1925); Khoury v. Community
Memorial Hosp., Inc., 203 Va. 236, 123 S.E.2d 533 (1962); State ex rel. Sams v.
Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n., 149 W.Va. 229, 140 S.E.2d 457 (1965).
67 See, e.g., Strauss v. Marlboro County Gen. Hosp., 185 S.C. 425, 194 S.E. 65
(1937).
68 See, e.g., Mauer v. Highland Park Hosp. Found., 90 Ill. App. 2d 409, 232
N.E.2d 776 (1967); Levin v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore City, 186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d
298 (1946); Halberstadt v. Kissane, 31 A.D.2d 568, 294 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1968); State
ex rel. Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n., 149 W.Va. 229, 140 S.E.2d 457
(1965).
69 See, e.g., Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59 (D.D.C.
1963), revd on other grounds, 348 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Moore v. Andalusia
Hosp., Inc., 284 Ala. 259, 224 So.2d 617 (1969); Mauer v. Highland Park Hosp.
Found., 90 11. App. 2d 409, 232 N.E.2d 776 (1967).
70 State ex rel. Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 149 W.Va. 229, 140 S.E.2d
457 (1965).
71 Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59 (D.D.C. 1963), rev'd on
other grounds, 348 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Akopiantz v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 65
N.M. 125, 333 P.2d 611 (1958).
72 See infra notes 74-97 and accompanying text.
73 See infra notes 74-77, 81-91 and accompanying text.
74 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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sity who was openly critical of the school was not renewed. The
professor brought suit alleging that the university's failure to renew his contract without notice or formal hearing violated his
right to procedural due process.7 5 In holding for the university,
the Supreme Court ruled that to substantiate a claim of violation
of a liberty interest, an individual must show damage to his
standing in the community or the imposition of a stigma or other
ostracism which would restrict future employment opportunities. 7 6 The Court noted that the university had made no such
allegations and that the failure to be rehired carried no stigma or
other future consequences.7 7
Shortly after Roth, the Supreme Court decided Paul v. Davis. 78 In Davis an individual accused of shoplifting brought suit
against the Louisville, Kentucky police department alleging that
the inclusion of his name and picture on a list of suspected shoplifters constituted an infringement upon his liberty interest.7 9
The Court concluded that reputation alone is not a constitutionally protected interest. In reaching its decision, the Court emphasized that the state had not restricted an existing liberty
interest and that a more substantial loss was required before due
process protections could be invoked. 0
Numerous courts have examined the existence of a liberty
interest in a health care context. For example, in Hoberman v.
1
Lock Haven Hospital,"
a physician had been accused of professional misconduct by a medical executive committee subsequent
to a hospital investigation and hearing. 2 Having no sanctions
for such misconduct, the committee circulated a memorandum
which stated,-without reference to the physician, the committee's
recommendation for instituting sanctions for future breaches of
ethical conduct. 83 The physician sought a rehearing to review
the charges against him and the hospital informed him of the
procedure to be followed. Deeming the hospital rehearing pro75 Id. at 568-69. The professor alleged that the university had acted in retaliation for his criticism of the school. Id.
76 See id. at 573. The Court stated that an individual's liberty interests are implicated only when the state has made a "charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his community." Id.
77 Id. at 573.
78 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
79 Id. at 697.
80 See id. at 711.
81 377 F. Supp. 1178 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
82 Id. at 1181.
3 Id. at 1181-82.
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cedure unacceptable, the physician submitted a counterproposal,
which the hospital rejected.8 4
The physician filed suit against the hospital, alleging that its
rehearing procedures denied him his right to due process. The
physician claimed that a hospital's activities constituted state action by virtue of its participation in federal and state program
funding, and thus he was entitled to due process protection
under the fourteenth amendment.8 5 The United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, while conceding
that the physician may have had a liberty interest, rejected the
physician's claim that state action was involved, 6 and held further that the hospital's rehearing procedure comported with due
8 7
process requirements.
In evaluating the existence of a liberty interest, some courts
have required that a physician demonstrate that the hospital had
published the allegations leveled against him. 8 8 Other courts
have required that the physician challenge accusations lodged
against him in order to substantiate controversies which may
arise in a hearing.8 9 Some jurisdictions have liberally interpreted
these requirements. For example, courts have asserted that a
physician's personal records and files which were available for inspection by prospective employers constituted "publication.' '9
Furthermore, a court may find a protectable liberty interest
where there is a scarcity of hospitals in a particular area. 9
Id. at 1182-83.
Id. at 1184-85.
86 Id. at 1186.
87 Id.
88See, e.g., Scarnati v. Washington, 599 F. Supp. 1554 (M.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 772
F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 795 (1986) (stigma not severe
enough and any "publication" of charges was made by physician, not hospital);
Hewitt v. Grabicki, 596 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Wash. 1984) (remarks made in proficiency report insufficient to satisfy publication); Giordano v. Roudebush, 448 F.
Supp. 899 (S.D. Iowa 1977) (disclosure of charges against doctor constituted publication sufficient to hamper future employment opportunities); Ritter v. Bd. of
Comm'rs, 96 Wash. 2d 503, 637 P.2d 940 (1981) (press release issued by hospital
and public statements made by hospital officials enough to satisfy publication
requirements).
89 See, e.g., Orloff v. Cleland, 708 F.2d 372, 378 (9th Cir. 1983).
1)( See Yashon v. Gregory, 737 F.2d 547, 556 (6th Cir. 1984); Giordano v.
Roudebush, 448 F. Supp. 899, 905-06 (S.D. Iowa 1977); Clair v. Centre Community Hosp., 317 Pa. Super. 25, 35, 463 A.2d 1065, 1070 (1983). See also Comment,
The "HorowitZ - and "Smith " Decisions: The Continuing Devitalization of the Liberty' Conicept, 43 Ai.B. L. REV. 863, 881 (1979).
)l See Foster v. Mobile County Hosp. Bd., 398 F.2d 227, 229 (5th Cir. 1968)
(court noted that defendant hospital was the only public hospital in the area and
that, without access to its facilities, plaintiff's practice would be limited); Clair v.
84
85
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Property Interest

The right to procedural due process under the fourteenth
amendment also protects an individual's property interest. The
Supreme Court in Roth stated that "[t]o have a property interest
in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract
need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." 9 2 The Court observed that the terms of the notice of
employment stipulated the conditions of Roth's employment
without any provision for renewal. 9 3 The Court held that the
terms of the contract failed to provide Roth with a property interest sufficient to invoke the fourteenth amendment.9 4
In Arnett v. Kennedy, 5 the Supreme Court evaluated the existence of a property interest in an employment relationship. The
Court found that a property interest in an employment relationship was entitled to fourteenth amendment due process protec96
tion only when the employee could be discharged for cause.
This decision gives rise to the supposition that an employee has a
continued right of employment except when due cause exists to
discharge him; he will therefore be entitled to due process in all
other situations. In situations where employment is determined
to be "at will," the Supreme Court has concluded that no property interest exists because the employer had the right to arbitrarily terminate employment and the employee had no
97
expectation of continued employment.
In the health care context, courts have held that because
hospital bylaws provide specific lengths of time for which staff
privileges are valid, the physician has a legitimate expectation of
employment and thus a property interest. 9 Any attempt to discharge him during this period will invoke his constitutional right
of due process. To do so without providing for due process
would infringe upon his property interest. A physician lacks a
property interest, however, when initially seeking staff privileges
Centre Community Hosp., 317.Pa. Super. 25, 35, 463 A.2d 1065, 1070 (1983)
(nearest hospital 30 miles away and plaintiff had no alternative hospital at which he
could treat his patients).
92

408 U.S. at 577.

93

See id. at 566 n.1.

94

Id. at 579.

95

416 U.S. 134 (1974).

96
97

See id. at 151-52.
See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345-46 (1976).

98 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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because a physician does not have a constitutional right to staff
privileges in a hospital. No cause of action would arise unless the
hospital's refusal to grant such privileges was arbitrary and capricious. Consequently, a physician will only have a property interest when a hospital threatens the revocation of preexisting staff
privileges.
III.

HOSPITAL CLAIMS IN LIGHT OF INCREASED

COMPETITIVENESS IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY

The issue concerning automatic revocation of a physician's
staff privileges upon termination of his employment contract is
relatively undeveloped. Case law in this area predominantly
deals with exclusive contracting and the denial of practice privileges in general.9 9 Recently, however, several courts have considered the validity of tying staff privileges with employment
agreements.
In Northeast Georgia Radiological Associates v. Tidwell,'
the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
medical staff privileges constitute a valuable property interest.
Consequently, physicians must be given notice and a hearing
prior to the termination or withdrawal of their staff privileges.'° 1
In Tidwell, a physician had applied for and received medical staff
privileges at Walton County Hospital. At a later date, the physician and his wholly owned professional corporation, Northeast
Georgia Radiological Associates, P.C., entered into an exclusive
10 2
contract to provide radiological services for the hospital.
99 See generally Classen, Jefferson Parish and its Progeny: More Efficient Health Care at
What Price?, 75 Ky. L.J. 441 (1987).
One of the first cases to specifically discuss this issue was Centeno v. Roseville
Community Hosp., 107 Cal. App. 3d 62, 167 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1979). In Centeno,
Roseville Community Hospital entered into an exclusive radiology medical services
contract with the Roseville X-Ray Medical Group, a medical partnership. Id. at 66,
167 Cal. Rptr. at 184. The plaintiff, Dr. Centeno, subsequently left the partnership,
and the hospital refused to allow him to continue to practice at the hospital, citing
its exclusive contract with his former medical partnership. Id.
Dr. Centeno brought suit alleging, inter alia, that the hospital had denied him
his due process rights and that exclusive contracts were illegal as against public
policy. Id. at 66, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 184-85. The court, however, found that Dr.
Centeno had not been denied due process and that the hospital had the authority
to enter into an exclusive contract. See id. at 70-77, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 187-91. Furthermore, it held that exclusive contracts do not discriminate within the requirements of the equal protection clause. Id. at 73-74, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89.
100 670 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1982).
101 See id. at 511.
102 Id. at 508-09.
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The contract specifically provided that termination would
only be for cause, and that all corporate employees must be
members of the hospital staff. 10 3 It further required that the corporation's employees' staff privileges would automatically be terminated if the radiological services agreement were discontinued." 4 It was stipulated that matters not provided for under
the contract were to be governed by the bylaws and policies of
the hospital. 0 5
The hospital terminated its contract with the physician and
his corporation and withdrew his privileges without offering a
pretermination hearing. The physician was later invited to attend the hospital's executive committee meeting to discuss his
termination, but he declined the invitation.' 0 6 The physician and
his corporation brought suit against the hospital alleging breach
of contract and a denial of their constitutional rights under sec10 7
tion 1983 of the Civil Rights Acts.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
that the physician was entitled to a hearing prior to the suspen103

Id. at 509. The contract provided that:
[T]his agreement shall be for a period of one year and shall be automatically renewed each successive year ... unless either party, within ninety
days from the anniversary date notifies the opposite party .... This

agreement may be terminated for cause by the Hospital as to any and all
those Hospital regulations which govern and control the other staff
members of the Hospital ....
Id. at 509 n.3. The contract further provided that "[t]he P.C.'s employees shall
comply with the policies, rules, and regulations of the Hospital. Id. at 509 n.4. The
contract also stated that P.C.'s employees were required to have medical staff privileges. Id.
104 Id. at 509. The contract provided that "it is further agreed that the P.C.'s
employees membership on the staff and all radiology privileges shall terminate if
this Agreement is terminated." Id. at 509 n.5.
105 Id. at 509. The contract specifically provided: "In other matters not agreed
upon herein they are subject only to the limitations of established medical staff and
Hospital policies and by-laws, and rules and regulations established for the control
and guidance of all staff positions." Id. at 509 n.6.
106 Id. at 509.
107 Id. at 510 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
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sion or termination of his staff privileges.'
The hospital's bylaws included three different procedural due process provisions
for the protection of a physician's rights.' 0 9 The court noted that
the physician contract with the hospital incorporated the hospital's medical staff bylaws and established the existence of rules or
mutually explicit understandings.' 'o
Central to the court's holding was its recognition of prior
decisions which found a property interest in a physician's medical
staff privileges which were therefore protected by the fourteenth
amendment.'" The court reasoned that because medical staff
privileges are a valuable property interest, notice and a hearing
must be held prior to their termination or withdrawal, except in
extraordinary situations where a valid governmental or medical
interest is at stake.'12 Additionally significant was the fact that
the physician had been granted staff privileges prior to entering
into the contract.
The most recent case in this area is Hospital Corporation of
Lake Worth v. Romaguera.1 3 In Romaguera, a pathologist brought
suit after his staff privileges were revoked following the termination of his employment agreement with the hospital." 4 His contract provided that he would have the exclusive right to render
pathology services for the hospital but that the contract could be
terminated without cause upon 120 days notice by either party.
The contract further specified that his staff privileges would be
automatically withdrawn upon termination of the contract. 115
After executing the contract, the hospital amended its bylaws
to provide that physicians in "medico/administrative" positions
Tidwell, 670 F.2d at 511.
109 See id.
108

110 Id.

I I Id. (citing Shaw v. Hosp. Auth. of Cobb County, 507 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1975);
Woodbury v. Mckinnon, 447 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1971); Chiaffitelli v. Dettmer Hosp.,
Inc., 437 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1971); Foster v. Mobile County Hosp. Bd., 398 F.2d
227 (5th Cir. 1968)).
112 Id. (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 & nn.7-8 (1972);
Glenn v. Newman, 614 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1980); Thurston v. Dekle, 531 F.2d 1264
(5th Cir. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 901 (1978); Burnley v. Thompson,
524 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1975); Duffield v. Charleston Area Medical Center, 503
F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1974); Jackson v. Norton-Children's Hosps., Inc., 487 F.2d 502
(6th Cir. 1973); Woodbury v. McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1971)).
''3
511 So.2d 599 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
114 See id. at 559-60. The hospital terminated the agreement in order to award
the exclusive contract to another physician group. See id. at 560.
115 Id.
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such as those who interpret electrocardiograms (EKG's) 16 and
electroencephalograms (EEG's) ' ' would retain their staff privileges even after their contract with the hospital expired.'" Dr.
Romaguera claimed that he held an administrative position and
was therefore protected by the bylaw revisions." 19 The hospital
argued, however, that the bylaws did not amend Dr.
Romaguera's contract because the contract required that both
parties mutually agree in writing to any changes. 120
The trial court found that Dr. Romaguera was a
"medico/administrative" physician and therefore was entitled to
the protections provided for under the bylaw amendments. 121
On appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeals concluded that a
contract between a hospital and a physician would be affected by
future bylaw amendments. 1 22 The court stated that the hospital
had enacted the bylaw amendments for its own self-serving purposes, specifically to meet the requirements of the joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH). 123 The court
held that the contractual requirement that any amendment be in
writing was satisfied by the written bylaw amendment. 124 The
court reasoned that the hospital would have assented to its own
bylaws as would have Dr. Romaguera since the amendments were
1 25
of benefit to him.

An important factor in the Romaguera case was the court's
recognition of the potentially lucrative nature of exclusive contracts.' 26 The court stated that these contracts are "extraordina116 Electrocardiogram is defined as "[t]he graphic record of the heart's action
currents obtained with the electrocardiograph." Id. at 448. The electrocardiograph is "[a]n instrument for recording the potential of the electrical currents that
traverse the heart and initiate its contraction." Id.
117 Electroencephalogram is defined as "[t]he record obtained by means of the
electroencephalograph." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 449-50 (5th ed. 1982).
The electroencephalograph is "[a]n apparatus consisting of amplifiers and a writeout system for recording the electric potentials of the brain derived from electrodes
attached to the scalp. It is useful in localizing intracranial lesions and brain tumors,
and distinguishing between diffuse and focal brain lesions in epilepsy." Id. at 450.
118 Romaguera, 511 So.2d at 560.
119 See id.

120

Id.

121
122
123
124
125
126

See id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.

See id. at 559-60. The court noted that "It]he pathologist in this case had such
a contract from which in 1981 . . .his P.A. grossed over $717,000 out of which he
only paid two associates $110,000." Id.
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rily lucrative and few applicants would hold out for post-contract
staff privileges if by doing so the renewal of the exclusive contract would be forfeit[ed]."' 2 7 The court's willingness to recognize the potentially lucrative nature of these contracts provides
an additional factor for consideration in future cases.
In Alonso v. Hospital Authority of Henry County,' 2 8 the Georgia
Court of Appeals concluded that a physician's constitutionally
protected property interest and right of due process is defined by
the terms of his individual employment contract. t 29 The court
found that the physician's contract failed to incorporate procedural safeguards.13 0 It distinguished Tidwell, in which the contract specifically incorporated the bylaws into the employment
prior to
agreement, thus providing for procedural due process
3
the termination of a physician's staff privileges.' '
The Tidwell and Romaguera decisions present an interesting
caveat to the contractual waiver of due process rights. If a physician's employment agreement specifically incorporates by reference a hospital's bylaws, he will be afforded their due process
protections. Furthermore, under the liberal interpretation of
Romaguera, a physician will also be protected by any bylaw
3 2
amendment, thus providing further due process protection.
Neither case, however, is incompatible with the holding of Alonso
that a physician's due process rights can be contractually waived
or limited.
Health care providers can structure their employment agreements, however, so that a physician's staff privileges will terminate simultaneously with his contract. In Anne Arundel General
Hospitalv. O'Brien,13 3 a hospital entered into an exclusive contract
with a group of radiologists to provide radiology services. 134 The
hospital granted them staff privileges which expired the same day
Id. at 561.
175 Ga. App. 198, 332 S.E.2d 884 (1985).
129 Id. at 202, 332 S.E.2d at 888 (citingJago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 18 (1981)
("Principles of contract law naturally serve as useful guides in determining whether
or not a constitutionally protected property interest exists.")).
130 See id. at 202-03, 332 S.E.2d at 888. Specifically, the court noted that the
contract failed to incorporate the hospital's bylaws. Id. at 203. Because the contract was drafted by the doctor, the court concluded that any ambiguity should be
construed against him. See id. at 202.
131 Id. at 202-03, 332 S.E.2d at 888 (citing Tidwell, 670 F.2d at 510). See supra
notes 100-12 and accompanying text (discussing Tidwell).
132 See supra notes 113-27 and accompanying text (discussing Romaguiera).
133 49 Md. App. 362, 432 A.2d 483 (1981).
134 See id. at 373, 432 A.2d at 488.
127

128
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as their employment contract. 35 When the hospital revoked
their staff privileges on the day their contract terminated, the
radiologists brought suit. The physicians argued that their due
process rights had been infringed upon because their staff privi3 6
leges existed separate and apart from the exclusive contract.

Affirming the trial court's decision in part, the appellate
court reasoned that because the contract dictated the terms of
their employment, 37 the physician's privileges were never intended to extend past the contract term. It held that the physicians were not entitled to due process and that they had not been
deprived of any property right. In further support of its decision,
the court noted the radiologists' admission that the hospital had
never promised to employ them after the termination of their
contract and that they knew the continuation of their medical
staff privileges was contingent on negotiating another contract. 3 8 Consequently, the court determined that the hospital
had legally terminated the radiologists' staff privileges. 39
IV.

A.

PROTECTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PHYSICIANS

Reaching an Equitable Balance

In resolving the inherent conflict between a hospital's alleged need for profitability and the physician's constitutionally
protected right of due process, one must first evaluate the underlying economic considerations. A hospital is dependent upon its
physicians to attract a large patient census which will patronize
the hospital and its ancillary services. Without such patronage, a

hospital will be unable to operate profitably. Consequently, it is
of great importance for a hospital to have a productive professional staff which will be able to maintain a high census.
The physician desires to enter into a relationship with a hospital that will provide him with support services and access to the
equipment necessary to perform his specialty. Other considerations important to the physician include a hospital's location and
accessability to patients. A well known hospital can attract and
direct patients to the staff physicians. As a result, physicians are

especially desirous of obtaining staff privileges at prestigious
hospitals.
135 Id. at 366, 432 A.2d at 486.

13s6 Id. at 370, 432 A.2d at 488.
137 See id. at 374-76, 432 A.2d at 490-91.
138 Id.

139 Id. at 378, 432 A.2d at 492.

1988]

PHYSICIAN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS

A hospital has superior bargaining power in negotiating a
contract because of the increasing number of physicians, ' 4 0 its
strong reputation in the community and often a level of specialization in certain procedures which are unavailable at other health
care facilities. Furthermore, most hospitals are in the enviable
position of having many more physicians apply for staff privileges
than the hospital can accommodate.
Every individual has a constitutionally protected right of due
process. 4 ' Although many health care providers are "private"
and thus do not meet the state action requirement for invoking
due process protections; any action to restrict a physician's due
process rights should be closely scrutinized. Accordingly, the judiciary must not allow hospitals to coerce physicians into waiving
their due process rights. Hospitals, in essence, are applying a
form of economic duress.' 42 In return for contractually waiving
due process rights, a physician will receive the exclusive right to
practice his specialty at a hospital. If the physician does not
waive his rights, the hospital will not enter into a contract. Because of the growing number of physicians, 4 3 many physicians
are willing to enter into an exclusive contract at any cost. If,
however, they fail to obtain such a contract or lose the right to
provide services, they face economic uncertainty.
It is only reasonable that a physician would have an expectancy of due process rights. By contracting with a physician, a
hospital attempts to capitalize on the physician's stature in the
community and profit from his talents. A hospital should not be
allowed to act in a parasitic manner and totally abandon the physician for another more profitable relationship.
By granting physicians due process rights, physicians will be
protected from decisions that are arbitrary and capricious or perhaps even politically motivated. There presently exists a great
conflict between the interests of health care providers and physicians. As hospitals attempt to exert their authority over physiSee supra note 16.
See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Marroquin-Manriquez v.
INS, 699 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1983); Attoh v. INS, 606 F.2d 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1977); Nee Hao Wong v. INS, 550 F.2d
521 (9th Cir. 1977). See also supra note 29 and accompanying text.
142 Duress may render a contract voidable. See Chouinard v. Chouinard, 568
F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1978); Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Goren Equipment Co., Inc.,
576 F. Supp. 1348 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Citibank, N.A. v. Real Coffee Trading Co.,
N.V., 566 F. Supp. 1158 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); La Beach v. Beatrice Foods Co., 461 F.
Supp. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
143 See supra note 16.
140

141

SETON HALL 14 W REVIEW

[Vol. 18:4

cians, who traditionally have been independently minded, future
problems and frictions will arise. As tensions increase between
these two interests, a hospital's administration might be inclined
to terminate those physicians who are viewed as troublesome or
disruptive. Presently, many hospitals review physician records to
determine how many patients each physician admits. Thus, a
hospital may treat more favorably those physicians who generate
a level of income which it deems "acceptable."
Those providers which have been unable to contractually resolve the issue of due process rights through the simultaneous
termination of a contract and staff privileges, have attempted to
amend their bylaws to eliminate the right to due process. In such
situations, due process and other constitutional safeguards are
lost. Consequently, physicians should carefully review a hospital's bylaws and any subsequent amendments to determine the
effect on their due process rights. Employment contracts should
contain a clause providing that the contract will be governed by
the bylaws in existence at the time of the contract to avoid any
problems associated with future revisions.
Physicians are not without fault, however. The judiciary
should not protect those physicians who desire to maximize their
earnings yet seek due process protections when their contracts
are not renewed. Physicians who reap the benefits of exclusive
contracts should also bear the responsibilities that accompany
them. If a physician knowingly enters into a contract for a stipulated time period he should not be entitled to due process at the
end of the contract unless he had a reasonable expectation that
the contract or his staff privileges would be renewed.
Health care providers have a legitimate interest in providing
services only to those physicians who are economically productive and deliver high-quality health care. Health care providers
are justified in refusing to renew the contracts and staff privileges
of those physicians who are not economically cost-effective. Hospitals are under great pressure to operate profitably. Furthermore, those physicians who are of questionable professional
ability and who do not provide health care in conformance with
the hospital's expectations should also be denied staff privileges.
Since hospitals can only accommodate a limited number of
physicians, they must ensure that physicians with expired contracts vacate the hospital in a timely manner to allow the newly
appointed physicians the opportunity to meet their contractual
obligations. If the due process rights of physicians with expired
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contracts delay the starting date for new appointees for a substantial period of time, the new physician group will be unable to
assimilate quickly into the hospital. This delay might possibly affect the quality of health care delivered. Furthermore, the hospital may be unable to attract physician groups in the future
because of the possibility of their being drawn into a protracted
legal battle.
B.

Several Viable Alternatives

Requiring a health care provider to grant physicians due
process will have little effect on the hospital. The due process
requirement could be implemented with minimal effort on the
hospital's behalf within a short period of time through binding
arbitration. The hospital would be required to notify the physician that the status of his staff privileges was scheduled to be
changed and that the physician had the right to a hearing and
appeal if he so requested. A two week period should be allowed
for the physician to document his case and gather any supporting
evidence. A hearing would then be held allowing each party to
present its arguments before an impartial arbitrator. An artificial
time constraint could be set requiring the arbitrator to render his
decision within one week, with a one week period in which to
appeal. In submitting disputes to arbitration, each party should
agree to refrain from seeking a judicial remedy. Thus, the dispute would be completely resolved within a thirty day time span.
This is a viable alternative which should be incorporated into
all contractual relationships between health care providers and
physicians. Not only will the physicians' constitutional right to
due process be safeguarded, but any concern over efficiency and
expediency by the hospital would be addressed. This solution
would also alleviate the potential problem of costly as well as
lengthy litigation. Arbitration is not a burdensome alternative.
Binding arbitration is not the only means to resolve this issue. Health care providers and physicians could structure their
agreements according to the guidelines established in Anne Arundel General Hospital.'4 4 The contract should be drafted so that it is
effective for a stated number of years and that the physician's
staff privileges terminate on the same day as the employment
agreement. The physician would have no expectation of his staff
privileges continuing, thereby avoiding any economic hardship.
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If the physician's privileges were granted for a two year period he
would know that they may not be renewed at the end of that time.
Simultaneously, the physician will have gained the exclusive right
to provide medical services and the entitlement to due process
during the life of the contract.
Another alternative would be to provide in the contract that
the physician would retain his staff privileges but would be unable to utilize the hospital's facilities upon the termination of his
contract. This would allow a physician to continue practicing his
specialty at the hospital, but would facilitate the introduction of
new staff appointees. A radiologist, for example, would be unable to use the hospital's radiology equipment but would be able
to provide consultation services when other staff physicians requested his opinion. This arrangement would guarantee that the
hospital would be able to contract with a new physician group
while allowing a physician with an expired contract to retain his
staff privileges without interfering with the hospital's operation.
It is important that a physician retain those privileges he
possessed prior to entering into an employment contract. It
would be inequitable to require him to forfeit his prior privileges.
This concern was addressed in Tidwell,' 4 5 where the physician
had staff privileges prior to entering into his exclusive contract.
When the hospital terminated the contract, it terminated his preexisting staff privileges without providing due process. A physician should only be required to renounce those privileges he received through his exclusive contract. Thus, if he is granted
special privileges upon entering the contract, fairness dictates
that he lose only those privileges when the contract terminates.
By maintaining and respecting this status quo, physicians and
health care providers will be able to avoid the due process concerns associated with the retention of staff privileges.
V.

CONCLUSION

In recent years, there has been a continuing trend to limit
the due process rights of those physicians who enter into contractual relationships with health care providers. While this action is
defended by many hospitals as necessitated by increased competition within the health care industry, these concerns do not justify the limitation of an individual's constitutional rights. By
accepting the hospitals' argument the danger exists that eco145
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nomic concerns will be used to further limit individual due process rights. At the same time, however, one must recognize that
physicians often waive such rights in order to obtain the exclusive
right to provide a medical service and to reap the financial benefits that accompany these contracts.
Due process protection for those physicians who contract
with health care providers must be safeguarded in order to avoid
inequitable results. Affording physicians due process rights will
not impede the operation of a hospital or affect its profitability
and efficiency. If the termination of a physician's staff privileges is
justified, such action should only be taken after granting the physician due process. Courts should limit the ability of health care
providers to infringe upon the constitutional rights of physicians.
The judiciary should not allow them to act in an unconscionable
manner when such a valuable property interest is at stake.

